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This report reviews the 2009/10 implementation of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme 
2009/10 in the context of experience from 2005/6 to 2008/9.  
The 2009/10 programme differed from previous years in restriction of fertiliser subsidies to 
maize production, reduced fertiliser distribution budgets which were also adhered to, large 
increases in maize (particularly hybrid) and legume seed distribution, considerable carry 
forward of fertiliser stocks from previous year purchases, and earlier sales of fertiliser.  
These changes all have important positive implications for the programme’s effectiveness 
and efficiency as a result of reduced displacement, improved targeting, reduced programme 
costs (which also benefited from lower fertiliser prices), improved  returns to use of 
subsidised fertiliser on hybrid maize, and food security, diversification and soil fertility 
benefits from the increased legume seed sales. Increased maize and legume seed sales 
through private retailers should also stimulate input market development. The economic 
benefit cost ratio for the programme is estimated at 1.12, a respectable result (despite the 
many difficulties with this analysis and its blindness to many longer term and intangible 
benefits) with considerable potential for further improvement. The macro-economic costs of 
the programme have also been substantially reduced as compared with the previous year 
and the year on year rises in costs halted. 
These are important achievements.  
There are two main areas where it is proposed that programme implementation could look 
for substantial improvements in the future: first in achieving greater transparency in 
beneficiary identification and coupon issues and second in allowing earlier sales of inputs.  
Greater transparency in beneficiary identification and coupon issues should build on 
achievements over the last four years (for example in improved targeting and  use of open 
meetings) by (a) resolving inconsistencies both in changing MoAFS farm family numbers 
across regions and with NSO estimates, (b) improving effective communication about 
coupon allocation and distribution systems, (c) increasing the transparency and 
accountability of these processes with, for example, the involvement of different 
stakeholders representing farmers, and (d) sharing and implementing good practice in 
particular districts or areas more widely across the country.  
Earlier input sales are important for reducing the costs and risks faced by farmers in 
redeeming coupons, promoting higher yield responses from earlier planting and fertiliser 
application, reducing pressures and costs in fertiliser deliveries to markets, and giving 
farmers more voice and choice when redeeming coupons. This requires that the 2009/10 
improvements in fertiliser deliveries and in seed contracting are sustained and accompanied 
by earlier finalising of coupon allocations and printing than in 2009/10 – as has already been 
recognised by strenuous attempts to achieve earlier commencement of sales in 2010.  
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1 Introduction 
The 2009/10 agricultural season is the fifth year in which the Malawi Government has 
implemented its national farm input subsidy programme. This paper presents information on 
the design and implementation of the programme, including its costs, with indicative 
information on its impacts in terms of incremental production. The purpose of the paper is 
review the 2009/10 programme (in the context of experience from 2005/6 to 2008/9) and 
raise issues for further examination in the review and evaluation of the 20010/11 
programme.  
The paper is the first of a series of papers being prepared in a programme of work from 
November 2010 to June 2011. Subsequent papers will discuss lessons from earlier studies 
on production estimation methodologies, targeting, and gender impacts, consider wider 
growth and other contributions of the subsidy programme, and, following field work in early 
2011, provide a review of the 2010/11 programme and consider potential for the application 
of the concept of ‘graduation’ in the future development of the programme.  
The paper draws upon the following principal sources of information: 
• 2009/10 Final report of the Logistics Unit – the major source of 2009/10 information  
• Logistics Unit Weekly reports 
• Various monitoring reports by FUM and MEJN 
• Earlier evaluation reports 
• MoAFS FISP Implementation Guidelines  
Following this introduction the report provides a detailed consideration of 2009/10 
programme implementation and outputs, with a comparison of the 2009/10 programme with 
previous years. The conclusions detail the main achievements, issues and challenges in the 
2009/10 programme and sets out some recommendations for future design, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation.  
 
2 Programme design and implementation  
2.1 Programme objectives and overall design 
The objectives of the programme are to improve national and household food security and 
self sufficiency and incomes through increased food and cash crop production and 
productivity as a result of improved accessibility and affordability of agricultural inputs among 
the most vulnerable farmers. 
The core of the FISP is the transfer to selected rural households of a coupon which is 
intended to benefit them by enabling them to increase their use of agricultural inputs 
(principally fertiliser and seed). However if beneficiaries choose to sell the coupon or if they 
use it to finance the purchase of inputs that they would have purchased anyway then the 
receipt of a coupon effectively gives them a cash transfer with, in the former situation where 
coupons are sold, buyers of coupons and of inputs taking a share of that transfer.  
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Major elements of the programme are summarised below in figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Major elements of FISP  
 
The implementation of each of these elements is discussed in more detail below but it is 
important to note here the complexity of the programme as regards (a) the number of 
different activities involved (b) the complex relationships between these activities, in 
particular with regard to their timing, and (c) the number of different stakeholders involved 
with different interests in different activities.   
The 2009/10 programme differed from the previous year in a number of ways: 
• Subsidised fertiliser was intended and targeted for use only on maize (no supplies 
were budgeted for other crops) 
• The targeted volume of subsidised fertiliser was reduced 
• No subsidies were provided for crop protection chemicals apart from grain storage 
chemicals ( but information is not currently available on their disbursement or costs) 
• Volumes of subsidised seed (both maize and legume) were considerably increased 
as compared with previous years, with separate coupons and larger quantities of 
hybrid and OPV seed provided per coupon (5 and 10kg per pack respectively as 
compared with 2 and 4kg per pack in 2008/9).  
• Beneficiaries were required to have voter ID cards from the 2009 elections 
• There were considerable fertiliser stocks carried forward from purchases the previous 
year 
Main changes in programme design and implementation over the life of the programme are 
detailed in table 1 while table 2 summarises the main programme achievements by year 
over the same period.   
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Table 1: Principal changes in programme design and implementation, 2005/6 to 2009/10 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
                   
Subsidised inputs 
Maize & tobacco 
fertilisers, Maize seed 
(OPV)  
Maize & tobacco 
fertilisers, Maize seed 
(hybrid & OPV)  
Maize & tobacco 
fertilisers, Maize seed 
(hybrid & OPV); legume 
seed (limited); cotton seed 
& chemicals 
Maize & tobacco fertilisers, 
Maize seed (hybrid & 
OPV); legume seed, cotton 
seed & chemicals, maize 
storage chemicals 
Maize fertilisers only; 
More maize seed 
(hybrid & OPV) per 
pack; Legume seed. No 
fertilisers or chemicals 
for cash crops. Not over 
budget. Large buyback. 
Coupon distribution 
system 
District allocation by 
maize areas, distribution 
through TAs 
District allocation by maize 
areas, distribution varied, 
through local government, 
TAs, VDCs, MoAFS 
District allocation by farm 
hh & areas, distribution 
through MoAFS and 
VDCs 
District allocation by farm 
hh & areas; use of farm 
household register, open 
meetings for allocation & 
disbursement led by 
MoAFS 
District allocation by 
farm hh & areas; use of 
farm household 
register, open meetings 
for allocation & 
disbursement led by 
MoAFS Voter 
registration numbers & 
ID required for 
registration, receipt & 
redemption 
Coupon redemption 
systems 
Only through SFFRFM & 
ADMARC 
Fertilisers also through 
major retailers; flexible 
maize seed coupons 
through wide range of 
seed retailers  
Fertilisers also through 
major retailers; flexible 
maize & legume seed 
coupons through wide 
range of seed retailers; 
cotton inputs through 
ADDs  
Fertilisers only through 
ADMARC & SFFRFM; 
flexible maize & legume 
seed coupons through 
wide range of seed 
retailers; cotton inputs 
through ADDs   
Fertilisers only through 
ADMARC & SFFRFM; 
separate maize & 
legume seed coupons 
through  retailers, 
variable top up for 
maize seed  max 
MK100 
Other system 
innovations   
Coupons specific to 
fertiliser type. Fertiliser 
buy back system. 
Involvement of logistics 
unit 
Reduced copies of 
coupons. Remote EPA 
premium. Fertiliser buy 
back system 
Extra coupon security 
features & market 
monitoring. No buyback or 
remote EPA premium. 
ADMARC computers for 
coupon processing 
Complex extra coupon 
security features in 
Centre & North. 
Features (eg 
numbering) varied. 
Significant  fertiliser 
buyback & other carry 
forward from 2008/9. 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet), 2006/7 (SOAS et al), 2007/8 (MoAFS) and 2008/9 (Dorwardet al.) evaluation reports; MoAFS Implementation guidelines; 
GoM budget statistics. 
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Table 2 Summary of 2005/6 to 2009/10 programme implementation 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
Fertiliser coupon distribution  (mt 
equivalent) 
166,156 200,128 216,000 195,369 160,000 
Households receiving one or more 
fertiliser coupons 
n/a 54% 59%* 65% n/a 
Subsidised 'maize' fertiliser (mt)  108,986 152,989 192,976 182,309 159,585 
Subsidised 'tobacco' fertiliser (mt)  22,402 21,699 23,578 19,969 0 
Total subsidised planned 137,006 150,000 170,000 170,000 160,000 
 fertiliser sales (mt) actual 131,388 174,688 216,553 202,278 159,585 
Redemption price (MK/50 kg bag)  950** 950 900 800 500 
Coupon value, approx (MK/bag) 1,750 2,480 3,299 7,951 4,891 
Subsidy % (approx) 64% 72% 79% 91% 91% 
Subsidised maize seed (MT)  n/a 4,524 5,541 5,365 8,652 
% Hybrid seed  0% 61% 53% 84% 88% 
Cotton seed (mt) 0 0 390 435 0 
Legume seed (mt) 0 0 24 n/a 1,551 
Cotton chemicals coupons 0 0 131,848 n/a 0 
Total programme  
cost net of farmer 
redemption (MK 
million)  
Govt budget 5,100 7,500 11,500 19,480 19,400 
Actual total (inc 
donor costs) 
4,480 10,346 13,361 33,922 15,526 
 
Note:  Planned quantities of seed are not available: in 2009/10 1.6 million maize seed coupons and 
1.6 million legume seed coupons were issued, but seed purchases depended upon seed 
availability, pack sizes, and farmer choice  
 Reporting of some financial costs varied between years, and budget costs exclude some 
costs included in actual costs (eg seeds). 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet), 2006/7 (SOAS et al), 2007/8 (MoAFS) and 
2008/9 (Dorward and Chirwa) evaluation reports; MoAFS Implementation guidelines; GoM 
budget statistics. 
The 2009/10 achievements summarised in table 2 are discussed in more detail in the 
following sections which consider the main determinants of the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the programme: volumes of subsidised inputs, timing of activities, beneficiary access, and 
costs.   
2.2 Volumes of subsidised inputs 
As mentioned earlier and shown in table 2, there were some marked changes in subsidy 
volumes in 2009/10 as compared with previous years:  
• In previous years subsidised fertilisers had been provided for tobacco (and in 2008/9 
coffee and cotton)  but in 2009/10 fertilisers provided were intended only for maize.  
• Budgeted volumes of fertiliser had increased steadily from 2005/6 to 2008/9 but were 
reduced in 2009/10 
• Actual disbursements had exceeded budgeted disbursements from 2006/7 to 2008/9, 
and had been less than budgeted in 2005/6, but matched budgeted disbursements in 
2009/10 
• Maize (and particularly hybrid) seed sales increased dramatically  
• Legume seed sales increased dramatically (they were not part of the 2005/6 
programme while seed shortages severely limited disbursement in other years). 
These changes are shown graphically in figure 2. They all have important positive 
implications for the programme’s effectiveness and efficiency:  
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• The focus on maize should reduce displacement and improve targeting (as argued in 
our previous evaluation reports)  
• The reduced volumes of fertiliser disbursed – as a result of both smaller budgeted 
volumes and adherence to the budget – should both reduce displacement and 
control programme costs (as discussed later under programme costs).  
• The increased maize and hybrid seed sales should improve the returns to use of 
subsidised fertiliser (as discussed later under programme impacts) 
• The increased legume seed sales should contribute to food security objectives of the 
programme, encourage diversification, and have wider soil fertility benefits, 
complementing inorganic fertiliser use.  
• Increased maize and legume seed sales through private retailers should stimulate 
input market development 
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Figure 2 Subsidised fertiliser and seed sales 
We consider regional changes in subsidised fertiliser sales in section 2.4. 
2.3 Timing of subsidy sales 
The timing of subsidy sales is important as late sales can reduce the benefits of input use 
(from late planting and fertiliser application) and also take away farmers from working on 
their fields while they acquire inputs. Late acquisition may also depress unsubsidised and 
total input sales if farmers who would buy unsubsidised inputs hold back while they wait to 
see if they will be able to get subsidised inputs. The timing of subsidy sales is however 
determined by the timing of availability of inputs in markets and by the timing of issue of 
coupons to beneficiaries. For fertilisers the timing of input availability depends upon timing of 
tendering of input purchases and supplier deliveries to depots, and on staffing and stocking 
of input markets (for parastatal sales) and upon subsidy redemption contracts with retailers 
and their stocking and staffing of input sales points for private sector sales. Coupon issue 
depends upon timing of beneficiary registration, coupon allocations, coupon printing, coupon 
distribution to districts, and district distribution payments. Information on some of these 
variables is given in table 3 and figure 3.  These show a generally good record as regards 
fertiliser and seed logistics and sales, with improvements as compared with previous years, 
but not such a good record as regards coupon processes. We discuss these in turn.   
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Table 3: Performance indicators: timing of contracts, coupon processes and sales. 
  2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
Coupon distribution 
    District coupon allocations early Sept 9th Oct  12th Sept 15th Sept 
Coupon printing end Sept end Oct SR early Oct CR/NR mid Nov SR end Oct CR/NR mid Nov 
Coupon & lists distribution to districts virtually completed 7th November  
virtually completed 3rd 
November  
virtually completed 18th 
November  
virtually completed end 
November  
Fertilisers 
                
Tender awards for parastatal supplies late August mid August end July mid August 
Finalisation of retail fertiliser contracts early Nov  mid/late Nov n/a abandoned mid Sept  
Regional depot receipts 
as % new contracts 
end Oct  14% 35% 46% 52% 
end Nov 71% 62% 67% 94% 
end Dec 94% 85% 90% 103% 
Outstanding payments     
( % & MK million) 
 
end Oct  28% 1,216 22% 1,595 16% 3,500 13% 814 
end Nov 46% 4,303 13% 1,192 13% 3,690 11% 955 
end Dec 14% 1,406 21% 2,620 22% 7,707 6% 585 
Uplifts despatched as % 
parastatal total sales  
end Nov 64% 70%  75% 81% 
end Dec 96% 85% 91% 96% 
Sales as % total season 
sales  
end Nov  
 8%  
74% 
 96% 
 n/a 
64% 
88% 
33% 
72% 
94% 
 41% 
85% 
98% 
end Dec  
end Jan 
SFFRFM/ADMARC 
coupon returns ('000) 
end Nov  
 0 
0 
111 
 0 
101 
720 
17 
175 
1,057 
39 
506 
1,189 
end Dec  
end Jan 
Seeds 
    Finalisation of seed supply contracts  mid/late Nov  mid/late Nov  early Nov mid Sept 
Seed coupons in LU as  
% season sales  
end Nov  3% 1% 1% 2% 
end Dec  27% 4% 6% 23% 
end Jan 74% 18% 22% 53% 
 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2006/7 (SOAS et al), and 2008/9 (Dorward et al) evaluation reports. 
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Figure 3 Timing of subsidy activities 
 
The 2009/10 logistics of fertiliser supply were helped significantly by the large quantity of 
fertilisers carried over from the 2008/9 season – a little over 84,000 MT, of which it is 
understood 54,000MT were covered by a buyback agreement (LU, 2010). With the reduction 
in budgeted fertiliser sales this meant there was a substantial reduction in the quantity of 
fertiliser to be purchased under tender – down to 76,000MT. Tenders were called for on 16th 
April for submission by 1st June, and were awarded on 21st August. Since a number of 
suppliers had stocks in the country deliveries could and should have started immediately. 
However the available storage space was already occupied by the stock brought forward.1 
Movements between regional depots to match regional stocks to demand depended upon 
district allocations which were issued in mid-September. Further freeing of storage space 
depended upon the issuing of contracts to transporters and on available space in unit 
markets. Transport contracts were issued on 23rd September, allowing limited uplifting from 
late September, but this was limited by the space available at those markets until sales 
commenced at the end of October. Very rapid sales in November and December (roughly 
65,000 MT (40% of total sales) per month then placed very large challenges on fertiliser 
deliveries, exacerbated by fuel shortages at the end of November, leading to farmers facing 
considerable difficulties in accessing inputs (as discussed later in section 2.4).  
However, despite these difficulties, table 3 and figure 3 show that depot deliveries, uplifts 
and sales were conducted earlier than in the three previous years. In addition payments to 
                                            
1
 A further difficulty that arose as a result of the carry forward of fertiliser stocks from 2008/9 was that 
it included just over 1,100MT of D compound and CAN which were not required for the 2009/10 
programme. Around 9,500MT of this were sold instead of 23:21:0 and Urea.  
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suppliers were more timely, and return of redeemed fertiliser coupons by ADMARC and 
SFFRFM was also improved.  
The contracts for the supply of seeds were finalised in mid-September, very considerably 
earlier than in previous years. Very limited information is available on the timing of actual 
seeds sales. The Logistics Unit does, however, report on seed coupons submitted for 
redemption, and suppliers will normally try to submit these quickly since they are required for 
payment. Table 3 shows more rapid receipt of coupons in 2009/10 than in the previous two 
years. Percentage returns were higher in 2006/7 but since this was on a smaller number of 
coupons, absolute numbers of returned coupons were still higher in 2009/10.   
As should be clear from figure 1 and from the discussion of the timing of fertiliser sales and 
logistics, the timing of input sales is very dependent upon the timing of issue of coupons to 
beneficiaries, and subsequent opening of the programme for sales. The issuing of coupons 
is itself dependent upon the prior printing of coupons and identification / registration of 
beneficiaries, and these activities are in turn dependent upon the overall budgeting and 
planning of the programme, farmer registration, and  district allocations of coupons (see 
figure 1). Table 3 and figure 3 show that district allocations of coupons in mid September 
2009 was at roughly the same time as in previous years, while printing of coupons and their 
distribution to districts were completed later than in previous years (opening of the 
programme is somewhat earlier than shown, but follows the same pattern).   
When reviewing the timeliness of programme activities as a whole, the following points 
should be noted: 
• There were marked improvements in the timing of fertiliser deliveries and finalisation 
of seed contracts which are highly commendable 
• Some improvements in timing of fertiliser deliveries were aided by the availability of 
carry forward stocks from the previous year 
• As in previous years late opening of the programme led to very large demand for 
sales in November, demand which could not be met.  
• The large carry forward stocks could not overcome, and indeed in some ways 
exacerbated, problems of limited storage space due to late opening of sales.  
• There would be very significant gains to farmers and the programme if sales could 
start earlier, and this requires earlier distribution of coupons to districts, with earlier 
printing, and this in turn requires earlier finalisation of  district coupon allocations. 
It may also be noted that even for activities implemented earlier than in previous seasons, 
their timing is still later than suggested in a schedule discussed in 2008. This proposed that 
coupon redemption and subsidised sales should run from May to December to allow farmers 
to purchase subsidised inputs over a much longer time period, starting from the previous 
season’s harvest. This would require much earlier issue of tender documents (by the end of 
February) with awards in April and coupon distribution in April and May. While there may be 
difficulties with this timetable (for example the Government budget cycle), it emphasises the 
importance of earlier action, particularly on determination of district coupon allocation as this 
and coupon printing, which depends upon it, were critical in delaying the start of input sales 
in the 2009/10 season, with attendant high demand and stock out problems in November for 
farmers, unit markets, and fertiliser deliveries. 
2.4 Beneficiary access  
Beneficiaries’ access to inputs is determined by coupon allocations and receipts and by their 
ability to redeem coupons, which may be affected by availability of subsidy inputs in 
accessible markets, by their ability to afford the costs of redeeming coupons (including time, 
travel costs, and any ‘tips’ paid when redeeming coupons). These factors interact, as limited 
allocations or shortages of inputs tend to increase the costs of redeeming inputs, particularly 
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for more vulnerable people who are important intended beneficiaries of the programme (the 
elderly, women, the sick and infirm, and children).  Comprehensive information is not 
available on these topics: household surveys are needed to provide systematic information 
and no survey data are available for the 2009/10 season. We therefore consider information 
that is available and that can provide some indications of issues here: regional allocations of 
input coupons and input sales as compared with regional populations, and information from 
reports compiled by FUM and MEJN from monitoring of targeting, coupon redemption and 
input access at selected markets in selected districts.  
We begin by considering the redemption of fertiliser coupons across the different regions as 
compared with the number of farm households in each region. Figure 4 shows the number of 
coupons redeemed per farm family and total coupon redemptions by region.  
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Figure 4 Fertiliser coupons redemptions by region 
 
These graphs are of interest as they shed light on possible differing and changing 
availabilities of fertiliser coupons across the three regions. The right hand graph shows that 
total coupon redemptions increased in all regions from 2005/6 to 2007/8. They then fell back 
substantially in the central region in 2008/9 and less substantially in 2009/10, ending up in 
2009/10 marginally below 2005/6 redemptions. The northern region shows a similar pattern, 
although the decline in 2009/10 was greater than the decline in 2008/9, and the overall 
decline from 2005/6 to 2009/10 was slightly greater than in the centre. The southern region 
experienced a similar rise in redemptions from 2005/6 to 2007/8, and this then  continued in 
2008/9, before falling in 2009/10, but ending up with 2009/10 redemptions a little less than 
double those in 2005/6. The left hand graph shows in some respects a similar pattern across 
the regions for coupon redemptions per household. However, the increases from 2005/6 to 
2007/8 (or 2008/9 for the southern region) are less pronounced, and the falls to 2009/10 are 
much more pronounced, so that only for the southern region are redemptions per household 
greater in 2009/10 than in 2005/6. The discrepancies between these two graphs arise 
because of increases in the number of farm families estimated or (in the last three years) 
registered by MoAFS. These are shown in table 4.  
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Table 4 Farm families and households by year and region 
 
Number of farm families (MoAFS) Increase 
2005/6 to 
2009/10 
NSO 2008 
Census total 
households 
 
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
North 387,583 n/a 477,979 478,645 501,723 29% 345,752 
Centre 1,247,867 n/a 1,455,376 1,575,706 1,893,800 52% 1,222,365 
South 1,646,200 n/a 1,603,288 1,618,257 1,790,743 9% 1,389,566 
All 3,281,650 n/a 3,536,643 3,672,608 4,186,266 28% 2,957,683 
Source: Logistic unit reports, MoAFS data 
 
Table 4 shows high and highly variable rates of growth in the number of farm families across 
regions and across years and a wide discrepancy between 2007/8 to 2009/10 MoAFS 
numbers and NSO 2008 census numbers. Over the years MoAFS farm families’ numbers 
have increased by widely differing rates across the three regions (29%, 52% and 9% in the 
north, centre and south respectively). Within each region there are widely differing rates of 
increase between years: there was an increase of 23% in the north from 2005/6 to 2007/8, 
with increases of 0 and 5% in the two subsequent years; in the centre an increase of 17% 
from 2005/6 to 2007/8 was followed by subsequent annual increases of 8 and 20%; in the 
south there was a fall of 3% in reported farm families from  2005/6 to 2007/8 with increases 
of 4 and 14% in subsequent years. These variable and on average high rates of growth 
contrast with a national intercensal annual household growth rate of 2.5% (3.6, 3.1, and 
2.1% in the north, centre and south respectively) calculated from NSO (2008).  
Two explanations for the very high growth and variable rates in MoAFS farm family 
estimates are reported anecdotally: the splitting of households when registering and the 
creation of ‘ghost villages’ and ‘ghost farm families’ in the registration process. Some 
combination of these two explanations is likely, together with the correction of omissions or 
over-counting from year to year and the possibility of some under-counting in the census. 
Increased numbers of ‘split’ and ‘ghost’ farm families and variation in these increases across 
regions and across years are also compatible with the patterns observed in total and per 
farm family coupon redemptions (as shown in figure 4 and discussed above), with 
comparisons between NSO and MoAFS estimates of household and farm family numbers, 
with analysis of coupon receipts and fertiliser purchases (see Dorward et al, 2010b) and with 
widely held perceptions that the number of coupons has been declining over time (reported 
in the 2009 household survey – see Dorward et al, 2010b, and in FUM 2009/10 monitoring 
reports).  
Considerable attention has been given to these issues here as they have two important 
implications for beneficiary access to subsidised inputs.  
• First, over the life of the programme there has been a clear shift in the proportion of 
coupons from the central and northern regions to the southern region. This has led to 
a more even distribution of coupons per farm family across the regions (although if 
household numbers are more inflated in the centre and north than in the south, as 
seems likely, coupons per farm family may still be higher in the north and centre than 
in the south). Given the higher incidence of poverty in the southern region, the 
relative increase in coupon redemptions in the south should lead to more coupons 
going to poorer people. This should not only improve targeting to poorer people, it 
should also reduce displacement of unsubsidised purchases by subsidised 
purchases.  
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• Second, opposing this improvement in targeting from the relative shift in coupons to 
the southern region, however, are detrimental effects from increases in real, ‘split’ 
and ‘ghost’ farm families. Increases in real and ‘ghost’ numbers mean that there are 
fewer coupons available per farm family, whether poor or less poor. Increases in 
‘split’ farm families might be expected to discriminate against smaller, poorer 
households or those with larger proportions of children (for example female, child 
headed households or those with more children).   
As noted earlier, beneficiary access to subsidised inputs is not only determined by the 
availability and allocation of coupons, it is also determined by the availability of inputs for 
redemption, by costs incurred in redemption, and by the ability of different households to 
afford those costs. There is no systematic information on these issues for the 2009/10 
seasons, only information from FUM / MEJN reports from monitoring of targeting, coupon 
redemption and input access at selected markets in selected districts and from stakeholder 
consultations. These reports provide largely anecdotal information as there is no consistent 
reporting of issues across different markets and districts over time (indeed reports for 
different weeks contain the same information for some districts) and no formal sampling of 
respondents. It is also difficult to judge the reliability or general applicability of sometimes 
contradictory information gained from different respondents. Although it is likely that the 
issues raised are real, their extent and severity is difficult to judge. Indeed a major 
conclusion that can be drawn from these reports is that there is significant variation in 
procedures, successes and problems across different districts and indeed across different 
markets within districts.  
With regard to coupon distribution, there were repeated reports of instances where farmers 
complained about the very limited numbers of coupons issued relative to numbers of farmers 
registered and of cases where farmers believed that they had been registered for receipt of 
coupons but did not receive them. Such reports were generally associated with complaints 
about lack of transparency and rumours of agricultural staff and/or headmen diverting 
coupons. However, one of the reports also concludes that farmers are generally satisfied 
with the distribution, and there are also instances of good practice in coupon distribution with 
committees involving a wide range of stakeholders, including women, in transparent coupon 
allocation.  
Reports of periodic and sometimes long standing ‘stock outs’ of fertilisers were common 
among substantial numbers of sampled markets. Where ‘stock outs’ occurred they led to 
substantial difficulties for farmers trying to redeem coupons. These involved time spent away 
from their farming, sometimes sleeping outside markets for more than one night, with costs 
for transport and subsistence, and particular difficulties and risks for women and for their 
children, and for the elderly and infirm. Queues also encouraged the requirements for ‘tips’ 
to get to the front of the queue and/or to redeem coupons. Farmers also needed to travel 
long distances to reach markets which were reported to have inputs in stock – but could then 
be disappointed to find them out of stock. Some markets also operated sales systems that 
appeared to require farmers’ attendance over longer periods (for example separating the 
paper work from the issue of inputs) and/or had insufficient staff to deal with the demand. 
Almost all of these reports concerned fertiliser sales from ADMARC and SFFRFM markets, 
but there was one report of difficulties with seed purchases from a private company.  
However, there were also substantial reports of markets where no ‘tips’ were required, and 
of markets which were well organised in ways that reduced these problems, through better 
coordination of and information on stock availability for farmers, through better management 
of sales procedures, and through the establishment of special queues for more vulnerable 
beneficiaries (for example pregnant women, women with children, the elderly, the sick and 
infirm).  
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There are mixed reports on the use of Voter Identification cards in the process of beneficiary 
identification and coupon redemption. Some reported that it was helpful in reducing  
diversion of coupons to traders from neighbouring countries (FUM, 2009) while others were 
concerned that it discriminated against those that did not vote in the 2009 elections - for a 
variety of valid reasons (FUM/MEJN 2010) and that it was not 100% effective in preventing 
fraud as approximately 1% of beneficiaries registered had missing or duplicate voter 
identification numbers and it placed an extra administrative burden during registration 
(Logistics Unit Final Report, 2009). While it is difficult to determine what are the relative 
benefits and costs of implementing these kinds of checks, it would seem clear that if they are 
to be implemented then a national identity card system would be needed to overcome 
problems with voter identification discussed above, with systems to ensure that they are 
regularly kept up to date (with removal of cards after deaths and new issues for  new adults), 
that systems are universally followed with minimum administrative load, and that they also 
take account of difficulties of intra-household relations and the relative rights of men and 
women to access coupons and redeem inputs.  
2.5 Programme costs  
The Logistics Unit Final Report presents a breakdown of ‘known’ financial costs for the 
2009/10 programme, and also lists a set of unknown costs. Table 5 below sets out estimated 
and known costs. Costs have been included for fertiliser carried forward in stock but not 
included in the buyback scheme, valued at the average for tender deliveries. Losses on the 
buyback are excluded. This means that the high purchase costs of fertiliser carried forward 
due to high prices in 2008 have not been assigned to 2009/10 programme costs.   
Table 5 Estimated programme costs 
Item MK Million Source / Notes 
Costs 
Seeds - legumes 399.96 Logistics Unit report 
Seeds – maize  2,421.11 Logistics Unit report 
Fertiliser - "Buy back" from 2008/9 4,970.00 Logistics Unit report 
Fertiliser - brought forward no 'buyback' 3,372.76 Estimate: priced at average for tender deliveries 
Fertiliser  - new supplies 8,080.08 Logistics Unit report 
Transport Costs 894.27 Logistics Unit report 
Logistics Unit operational costs 30.38 Logistics Unit report 
ADMARC operational costs 195.00 Logistics Unit report 
SFFRFM operational costs 150.00 Logistics Unit report 
MoAFS operating costs 1,100.00 Estimate: Dorward et al (2010a) for 2008/9 
Coupon printing 20.00 Estimate: Dorward et al (2010a) for 2008/9 
Other agencies 32.00 Estimate: Dorward et al (2010a) for 2008/9 
Bank charges on buy back 248.50 Estimate: 5% on buyback value 
Total estimated costs 21,914.05 
      Less: Farmer redemption due 1,614.95 Estimate from redemptions & value  
Total Net costs 20,299.10 
Funding 
Direct Donor Support 2,470.39 Pledged funds (LU report), May exchange rates 
Government of Malawi (balance) 17,828.71 Balance, net of farmer redemption 
Total 20,299.10 
Other donor support  (TA, reporting) 37.59 Pledged funds (LU report), May exchange rates 
Sources: Own calculations from sources listed in table  
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The budget for the 2009/10 programme was Million MK19,400. However not all the costs 
included in table 4 should be set against that budget – notably the fertiliser carried forward 
without any buyback will have been included in the previous year’s budget. Exclusion of this 
would give government expenditure of Million MK 16,071 before deduction of farmers’ 
redemption and Million MK 14,456 net of redemption, well within budget. As table 2 shows, 
2009/10 costs have fallen back dramatically from 2008/9 programme costs as a result of 
tight control of  a lower budgeted  quantity of subsidised fertiliser and much lower prices for 
fertilisers.  
 
3 Outputs and impacts 
Major outputs and impacts of the programme involve incremental crop production, 
household food security, household incomes, export earnings (or import savings), effects on 
the Malawian input supply industry, and wider macro-economic effects.  
The major objectives of the subsidy have been to achieve food self-sufficiency and 
increased income of resource poor households through increased food and cash crop 
production. Increased production results from incremental use of inputs (mainly fertilisers 
and seeds) leading to increased yields, moderated by the yield response to these inputs 
which depends upon the weather and the efficiency of input use and crop production. 
Incremental input use (the extra input use caused by the subsidy) is equal to the increase in 
input use in a subsidy year adjusted by any changes in input use that would have happened 
anyway without the subsidy, as a result of changes in input prices, output prices, and 
farmers’ access to seasonal finance. Constant annual changes in input and output prices 
and in access to seasonal finance make it difficult to estimate changes in input use that 
would have happened anyway, and there are no survey data which would allow econometric 
estimation of changes in farmers’ demand for unsubsidised inputs. However, econometric 
estimation from 2006/7 and 2008/9 survey data gave relatively low estimates of 
displacement of unsubsidised purchases by subsidised purchases (23% and 3% 
respectively, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2010) and consequently high rates of incremental 
fertiliser use as a result of the subsidy programme, but these figures do not allow for 
diversion with some subsidised fertiliser consequently mis-classified as unsubsidised. While 
2008/9 displacement was probably reduced as a result of the high prices of unsubsidised 
fertilisers that year (prices which have since fallen), displacement was higher for ‘tobacco 
fertilisers’ than for ‘maize fertilisers’, and the 2009/10 programme excluded ‘tobacco 
fertilisers’.  
Table 6 sets out the estimated incremental maize production as a result of subsidised 
fertilisers and maize seeds, together with estimates of the economic and financial returns 
from increased maize production as a result of the programme. The fiscal costs of the 
programme are adjusted to exclude the costs of displaced fertiliser, further on-farm 
economic costs are added, and downward adjustments are made to non-tradable costs 
using a shadow exchange rate to represent the effects of the widely reported over-valuation 
of the exchange rate (see for example Lea and Hanmer, 2009). 
 
Total benefits from the programme are determined by the value of incremental  production, 
which is affected by maize prices, technical returns to on farm input use, and displacement 
rates.  A displacement rate of 15% is used, taking account of the issues raised above, and 
similar yield response rates to those used in the 2006/7 and 2008/9 analyses.  Maize is 
valued at $260/MT using an average of ‘without subsidy’ import parity price of $300/MT and 
 14 
 
a ‘with subsidy’ domestic price of $220 /MT (equivalent to MK33/kg at an exchange rate of 
150MK/$US). The analysis considers only benefits from incremental maize production from 
subsidised fertilisers and maize seed: costs and benefits of subsidised legume seed are 
excluded as necessary information is not available on the impact of the subsidised legume 
seed on legume areas and production.  
 
Table 6 Estimated programme costs and benefits 
 
Units 
Price 
(OER) 
No 
units Cost 
OER, no 
displacement 
SER, 
displacement 
Shadow exchange rate  MK/US$ 141.31 170.00 
Fertiliser displacement % 0% 15% 
Incremental fertiliser used MT 159,585 135,647 
Government costs 
Incremental fert. (supply & transport) US$ 774 123,523,629 104,995,085 
Hybrid seed US$ 2,123 7,619 16,175,385 14,684,526 
OPV seed US$ 1,062 1,033 1,096,546 995,479 
Legume seed US$ 0 0 
Other seed US$ 0 0 
Program implementation  US$ 10,808,890 9,812,652 
Total Gross Cost US$ 151,604,451 130,487,742 
Less fertiliser redemption by farmers US$ 71 11,293,472 7,979,250 
Total Net Cost US$ 140,310,979 122,508,492 
Farmer costs 
Cost of fertiliser US$ 11,293,472 7,979,250 
Local transport etc in purchasing 
inputs US$ 11,144,607 9,263,614 
Fertiliser application labour US$ 5,646,736 3,989,625 
Harvest labour US$ 41,209,394 29,822,794 
Extra cost for displaced fertiliser US$ 0 15,018,258 
Total farmer costs US$ 69,294,209 66,073,541 
Total Government & Farmer Costs US$ 209,605,188 188,582,033 
Benefits 
Incremental maize production MT 811,180 
Value Incremental maize production US$/MT 260 210,906,799 
Benefit cost ratio 1.118 
Net Present value US$ million 22.32 
Fiscal efficiency % 15.9% 
 
Notes :  Fiscal costs are programme costs with official exchange rate (OER) and no displacement. Costs of non-
maize seeds and grain storage chemicals excluded.   
50% of programme implementation costs and of seed costs are taken to be non-tradable so the mean of 
official exchange rate and shadow exchange rate (SER) is applied.  
Farmer labour and transport costs  from 2 million recipients, with 2 days/hh accessing inputs, MK300/hh 
transport and other costs, 25 days labour/MT harvested etc, 1 days application of fertiliser per bag, 
250MK/day wage.  
Extra costs of displaced fertiliser are 50% of its transport etc costs and 10% loss in its yield due to later 
application. 
Sources: Own calculations, costings from information in Logistics Unit 2009 Final report 
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Total incremental production of maize is estimated at just over 770,000 MT and the 
estimated benefit cost ratio is 1.118 with an NPV of US$ 22.32 million and fiscal efficiency 
(NPV/fiscal costs) of 15.9%. These results are sensitive to maize prices and as argued in 
earlier reports, although high domestic maize prices may raise the calculated benefit cost 
ratio from the programme, this ignores the costs to poor consumers of high prices, and high 
domestic prices depress real growth, poverty reduction and household food security.  
Comparison of economic rates of return across different programmes also ignore the time 
over which returns are achieved, and the rapid  return within less than a year is an important 
feature of the subsidy programme. A third way that these calculations under-estimate 
programme benefits is that they fail to account for the very severe long term effects of 
famine which lead to very high costs of not implementing the programme if the subsidies 
raise production sufficiently in bad years to prevent (a) poor food insecure households from 
implementing ‘coping’ or response strategies with very high long term costs (such as distress 
sales of assets at low prices, removal of children from school)  and (b) long term effects of 
child malnutrition on their physical and cognitive development, with severe damage to well 
being and productivity. Economic cost benefit analysis does not therefore provide particularly 
good measures of programme benefits, efficiency or effectiveness in terms of its promotion 
of food security and growth. Estimated returns are also sensitive to the shadow exchange 
rate (a higher SER leads to higher returns) and to yield responses. Fiscal efficiency and NPV 
are sensitive to displacement rates.  
Table 7 presents estimates of economic returns over the five years of the programme, using 
similar assumptions to those above unless otherwise stated.  
 
Table 7 Estimated economic returns 2005/6 to 2009/10 
 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
Maize price in BC & fiscal 
efficiency analysis (US$/mt) 143 154 250 280 
260 
Fertiliser price in analysis 
(US$/mt) 393 490 590 1,250 774 
Benefit cost ratio: high response 1.38 1.30 1.90 1.08 1.34 
Benefit cost ratio: moderate 1.12 1.06 1.54 0.90 1.12 
Benefit cost ratio: low response 0.86 0.81 1.18 0.72 0.90 
Fiscal efficiency: high response 0.76 0.44 1.13 0.09 0.46 
Fiscal efficiency: moderate 0.24 0.09 0.68 negative 0.16 
Fiscal efficiency: low response negative negative 0.23 negative negative 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Poverty incidence 50% 45% 40% 40% 39%  
Meals per day 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 n/a 
Sources: Own calculations; 2006/7 (SOAS et al), and 2008/9 (Dorward et al) evaluation reports, NSO 
Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) reports. 
Table 8 presents an estimate of the economic returns of the fertiliser subsidy by itself from 
the incremental returns achieved by adding the maize seed subsidy, using the moderate 
response assumptions in table 7. Incremental returns estimated for the maize seed subsidy 
are high, and the low returns estimated for the programme in the absence of seed show the 
importance of improved seeds in raising returns to fertiliser. However, it should be noted that 
these high returns to seed are only obtained in association with the fertiliser subsidy, and 
they cannot be extrapolated to justify much higher volumes of subsidised seed as this would 
lead to displacement effects and/or too much fertiliser would be applied per kg of seed 
(though aggregate seed use could still increase substantially before this would appear 
likely).  
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Table 8 Economic returns from fertiliser and incremental maize seed subsidy 
Only 
Fertilisers  
Incremental 
seed 
Total 
Programme 
Incremental production MT 599,390 211,790 811,180 
Incremental value US$ 155,841,333 55,065,466 210,906,799 
Fiscal cost US$ 106,828,487 15,680,005 122,508,492 
Farmer cost US$ 58,248,749 7,786,406 66,035,155 
Total Economic cost US$ 165,077,236 23,466,411 188,543,647 
BCR 0.944 2.37 1.119 
FE negative 1.80 0.159 
NPV US$ -9,235,903 31,599,055 22,363,152 
 
In view of the programme’s objectives to improve national food self sufficiency, a fiscal 
argument is often put forward to justify the programme – that the cost of the programme is 
less than the cost to the government of importing maize in the absence of the programme. 
We analyse this by comparing the fiscal costs of the programme with fiscal savings on 
government importation and subsidisation of white maize from South Africa as a result of 
incremental maize production from the programme. This analysis is sensitive to assumptions 
about the maize imports saved by the programme in normal years, the frequency of bad 
years, incremental production in bad years (which might be affected by poor rainfall), and by 
the costs of subsidising maize imports in the absence of the programme. Table 9 sets out 
how much the programme has to reduce imports in an average year in order to break-even 
fiscally for different frequencies of bad years and different assumptions as regards the 
savings in imports in a bad year.  It appears that savings in fiscal costs of food supplies and 
subsidies across normal and bad years do not on their own justify the fiscal costs of the 
programme, but they may nevertheless significantly reduce these costs (depending on 
assumptions regarding the costs of food subsidies in normal years, the frequency of bad 
years, and the programme’s incremental production in bad years – dependent upon the 
extent and nature of both subsidised seed use and poor rainfall). 
Table 9 Breakeven fiscal savings in imports in average years by frequency of bad 
years and incremental production in bad years  
incremental programme production 
in bad year as % normal 
125% 100% 75% 
average interval between 
bad seasons (years) 
4 230,000 460,000 687,000 
5 428,000 600,000 773,000 
 
Notes: Based on an import parity price of US $300 /MT for official imports from South Africa (based 
on SAFEX futures prices for white maize and $100/MT international transport) and internal 
transport and administration costs of further $100/MT for food / subsidy distribution, a 100% 
subsidy (ie free distribution) of maize in bad years and a maize price ceiling of 40MK/kg in 
normal years.  
Costings and normal year incremental production etc as in table 6.  
Incremental programme production greater than 100% may occur if short season hybrid 
varieties promoted by the programme are much less affected by poor rainfall than longer 
season local varieties.  
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The reduced fiscal and foreign exchange costs associated with the 2009/10 programme as 
compared with the 2008/9 and even 2007/8 programmes should have reduced the negative 
macro-economic impacts of the programme while its positive effects will have only 
diminished a little as regards incremental production.   
As regards impacts on private sector input suppliers, although the private sector were 
responsible for a large share of new tender deliveries (90%), the significant buyback and 
carry forward quantities from the previous year meant that the volume of their tender 
deliveries as relatively small (just under 69,000MT as compared with nearly 100,000 and 
over 160,000 MT in the previous two years, see table 10). Private retailers were not involved 
in the sale of subsidised fertilisers due to disagreement over the terms for participation. 
Small agrodealers and other private retailers should have benefited from involvement in 
increased subsidised seed sales.  
Table 10 Private sector involvement in subsidised input sales 
 
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 
Private sector fertiliser subsidy 
tender deliveries (mt) 70,000 99,386 97,845 162,840 68,844 
Private sector fertiliser subsidy 
tender deliveries (%) 48% 72% 71% 88% 90% 
Fertiliser retail by private sector 
(%)  0% 28% 24% 0% 0% 
 
 
4 Conclusions and recommendations 
In many ways the implementation of the 2009/10 subsidy programme demonstrates many 
important improvements and achievements as compared with implementation in previous 
years. These include: 
• More timely deliveries and sales of inputs 
• Control of physical budget overruns on subsidised fertiliser sales 
• Under expenditure on the financial budget - although some of this was the result of 
large carry over stocks as a result of budget over runs in 2008/9 
• More timely processing of fertiliser supplier payments  
• Greater and more timely return of input coupons by ADMARC and SFFRFM 
 
The programme has also benefited from the decision to exclude subsidies for cash crops 
inputs.  
As a result of these improvements (most of which have been discussed for some time and 
are in line with recommendations from earlier evaluations – for example SOAS et al 2008, 
Dorward et al, 2009 – and Logistics Units and other reports) and of the reduced international 
fertiliser prices, the estimated efficiency and economic returns of the programme have 
improved.  
There are however areas where further improvements could be made: 
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1. Late coupon allocations and printing delayed the opening of the programme and 
sales to the end of October, leading to significant stock outs and causing significant 
problems for farmers, unit markets and transporters 
2. Discrepancies between NSO and MoAFS estimates of farm families and the large 
and varied increases in MoAFS registered farm families over the last few years are 
associated with concerns about diversion of coupons and lack of transparency in 
coupon allocations: better information on farm family numbers and more transparent 
processes could improve coupon allocation procedures, building on previous 
successful innovations in coupon allocation processes 
3. Significant variability in the quality of coupon allocation, distribution and redemption 
processes presents opportunities for examples of good practice to be shared across 
areas 
4. Participation of private sector retailers in sales of subsidised fertiliser could relieve 
pressures on markets (as discussed under (1) above) and provide farmers with 
opportunities to source inputs from a greater variety of markets, increasing their 
choice and hence ability to get better and more reliable services. 
5. Monitoring procedures could be improved with the use of standardised forms and 
training to ensure that monitors collect more consistent, comparable and reliable 
information that can be more systematically collated.  
A number of these issues are being addressed in the 2010/11 programme implementation.  
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